I’m rebuilding the foundations of how we understand humans. My research replaces narrative-driven
explanations in the human sciences with precise, mechanistic accounts grounded in real-world
conditions, while also addressing foundational problems in mathematics and computing. My background
spans computer science, economics, and behavioral science, and I’m currently based at National
Taiwan University.
My research reconstructs the human sciences through comparison and grounding, replacing
narrative-style explanations with precise, mechanistic accounts grounded in real-world conditions,
while also addressing major foundational problems in mathematics and computing.
We argue that persistent replication failures in the human sciences reflect a deeper problem: many
theoretical constructs do not correspond to coherent, stable cognitive capabilities. We therefore
propose a six-domain cross-species framework and workflow for grounding the human sciences in more
robust cognitive functions shared across species.
Persistent failures of statistical and causal inference to match real-world behavior across
disciplines reveal a deeper limitation: mechanisms cannot be inferred from projected data
alone, because projected data need not preserve the properties of the original structure.
The deeper error is to treat mathematical decomposition as mechanistic decomposition,
even though these operations remain confined to projected data and are generally non-unique.
Prevailing accounts trace the origins of economic exchange to barter or symbolic trust—a framing
that places its roots in uniquely human invention. We overturn this assumption, proposing instead
that economic exchange originates in reciprocity: a social behavior shared with other social animals
and sustained by three mechanisms—individual-specific memory, reciprocity
expectation,
and cost–return sensitivity.
Modern economics inherited its form from eighteenth-century moral philosophy.
Yet many of its core ideas—rational agency, self-interest, and equilibrium—were historical
inventions, not
empirical facts.
To address this, we re-examine seven foundational myths and rebuild the field on cognitive and
behavioural
reality.
Humans do not possess a reliable capacity for mindreading. The contrast is striking: Theory of Mind
originated in research on chimpanzees, whose social behavior is organized largely around status and
power, while human lie detection remains near chance at roughly 54% accuracy. Social cognition is
therefore better described as tracking status and navigating power dynamics than as inferring mental
states.
Symbolic computation has long been treated as a technical problem. Its deeper failure is grounding:
it assumes that the world consists of discrete, jointly realizable conditions, but the world is not
structured that way. In open-world settings, information is often unknown, incomplete, or incorrect,
making symbolic systems highly likely to break because a single grounding failure can invalidate the
entire chain.