I’m rebuilding the cognitive foundation of how we understand humans.
Intelligence, society, and power aren’t mysteries—they are structured expressions of cognitive
architecture. This is a new theory of human reality—grounded in cognition, tested through
simulation. My background spans computer science, economics, and behavioral science. I’m currently
based at National Taiwan University.
I'm reconstructing human cognition as a biological extension—demonstrating that core capacities like
tool use, cooperation, fairness, and political strategy are not uniquely human, but shared with
other primates. This perspective leads us to reexamine intelligence and social cognition, redefining
their boundaries through functional and comparative analysis. On this foundation, we propose a new
account of society—where economy, finance and social institutions are not cultural constructs, but
structured expressions of cognitive architecture.
We argue that persistent replication failures in the human sciences reflect a deeper problem: many
theoretical constructs do not correspond to coherent, stable cognitive capabilities. We therefore
propose a six-domain cross-species framework and workflow for grounding the human sciences in more
robust cognitive functions shared across species.
Persistent failures of statistical and causal inference to match real-world behavior across
disciplines reveal a deeper limitation: mechanisms cannot be inferred from projected data
alone, because projected data need not preserve the properties of the original structure.
The deeper error is to treat mathematical decomposition as mechanistic decomposition,
even though these operations remain confined to projected data and are generally non-unique.
Prevailing accounts trace the origins of economic exchange to barter or symbolic trust—a framing
that places its roots in uniquely human invention. We overturn this assumption, proposing instead
that economic exchange originates in reciprocity: a social behavior shared with other social animals
and sustained by three mechanisms—individual-specific memory, reciprocity
expectation,
and cost–return sensitivity.
Modern economics inherited its form from eighteenth-century moral philosophy.
Yet many of its core ideas—rational agency, self-interest, and equilibrium—were historical
inventions, not
empirical facts.
To address this, we re-examine seven foundational myths and rebuild the field on cognitive and
behavioural
reality.
Humans do not possess a reliable capacity for mindreading. The contrast is striking: Theory of Mind
originated in research on chimpanzees, whose social behavior is organized largely around status and
power, while human lie detection remains near chance at roughly 54% accuracy. Social cognition is
therefore better described as tracking status and navigating power dynamics than as inferring mental
states.
Symbolic computation has long been treated as a technical problem. Its deeper failure is grounding:
it assumes that the world consists of discrete, jointly realizable conditions, but the world is not
structured that way. In open-world settings, information is often unknown, incomplete, or incorrect,
making symbolic systems highly likely to break because a single grounding failure can invalidate the
entire chain.